

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute

OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide, Version 1.0

Volume 6: Critical Asset Worksheets for Systems

Christopher Alberts Audrey Dorofee James Stevens Carol Woody


January 2005

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OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide, Version 1.0

Volume 6: Critical Asset Worksheets for Systems

CMU/SEI-2003-HB-003

Christopher Alberts Audrey Dorofee James Stevens Carol Woody

January 2005

Networked Systems Survivability Program

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FOR THE COMMANDER

Christos Scondras Chief of Programs, XPK

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Table 1:	Worksheets Provided in This Workbook
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About This Document

This document is Volume 6 of the *OCTAVE-S Implementation Guide*, a 10-volume handbook supporting the OCTAVE-S methodology. This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as systems.

The volumes in this handbook are

- Volume 1: Introduction to OCTAVE-S This volume provides a basic description of OCTAVE-S and advice on how to use the guide.
- Volume 2: Preparation Guidelines This volume contains background and guidance for preparing to conduct an OCTAVE-S evaluation.
- Volume 3: Method Guidelines This volume includes detailed guidance for each OCTAVE-S activity.
- Volume 4: Organizational Information Workbook This volume provides worksheets for all organizational-level information gathered and analyzed during OCTAVE-S.
- Volume 5: Critical Asset Workbook for Information This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as information.
- Volume 6: Critical Asset Workbook for Systems This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as systems.
- Volume 7: Critical Asset Workbook for Applications This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as applications.
- Volume 8: Critical Asset Workbook for People This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as people.
- Volume 9: Strategy and Plan Workbook This volume provides worksheets to record the current and desired protection strategy and the risk mitigation plans.
- Volume 10: Example Scenario This volume includes a detailed scenario illustrating a completed set of worksheets.

Abstract

The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation SM (OCTAVE®) approach defines a risk-based strategic assessment and planning technique for security. OCTAVE is a self-directed approach, meaning that people from an organization assume responsibility for setting the organization's security strategy. OCTAVE-S is a variation of the approach tailored to the limited means and unique constraints typically found in small organizations (less than 100 people). OCTAVE-S is led by a small, interdisciplinary team (three to five people) of an organization's personnel who gather and analyze information, producing a protection strategy and mitigation plans based on the organization's unique operational security risks. To conduct OCTAVE-S effectively, the team must have broad knowledge of the organization's business and security processes, so it will be able to conduct all activities by itself.

OCTAVE-S V1.0 Introduction

1 Introduction

This document contains the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationSM (OCTAVE®)-S worksheets related to critical assets that are systems. The activities related to these worksheets are focused on analyzing a critical asset.

Table 1 provides a brief introduction to the contents of this workbook, using activity step numbers as a key. For more details about how to complete each step, refer to the OCTAVE®-S Method Guidelines, which can be found in Volume 3 of the OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide.

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook

Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages	
Step 6	Start a Critical Asset Information worksheet for each critical asset. Record the name of the critical asset on its Critical Asset Information worksheet.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8	
Step 7	Record your rationale for selecting each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Information worksheet.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8	
Step 8	Record a description for each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Selection worksheet. Consider who uses each critical asset as well as who is responsible for it.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8	
Step 9 Record assets that are related to each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Information worksheet. Refer to the Asset Identification worksheet to determine which assets are related to each critical asset.		asset's Information Process S2 sset S2.1 Select Critical As			

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Introduction OCTAVE-S V1.0

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook (cont.)

Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
Step 10	Record the security requirements	Critical Asset	Phase 1	5-8
-	for each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Information	Information	Process S2	
	worksheet.		S2.1 Select Critical Assets	
Step 11	For each critical asset, record the	Critical Asset	Phase 1	5-8
-	most important security requirement on that asset's	Information	Process S2	
	Critical Asset Information worksheet.	1	S2.1 Select Critical Assets	
Step 12	Complete all appropriate threat	Risk Profile	Phase 1	9-54
	trees for each critical asset. Mark each branch of each tree for	Threat	Process S2	
	which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.	Translation Guide	S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	,
	If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on any threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the <i>Threat Translation Guide</i> .			
Step 13	Record specific examples of	Risk Profile	Phase 1	9-54
	threat actors on the Risk Profile worksheet for each applicable		Process S2	
	actor-motive combination.		S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	
Step 14	Record the strength of the motive	Risk Profile	Phase 1	9-54
	for deliberate threats due to human actors. Also record how		Process S2	
	confident you are in your estimate of the strength of the actor's motive.		S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	·
Step 15	Record how often each threat has	Risk Profile	Phase 1	9-54
-	occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your		Process S2	
	data are.		S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	
Step 16	Record areas of concern for each	Risk Profile	Phase 1	9-54
-	source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is		Process S2	
	a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.		S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	

OCTAVE-S V1.0 Introduction

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook (cont.)


Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
Step 17	Select the system of interest for each critical asset (i.e., the system most closely related to the critical asset).	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18a	Review paths used to access each critical asset, and select key classes of components related to each critical asset. Determine which classes of components are part of the system of interest.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18b	Determine which classes of components serve as intermediate access points (i.e., which components are used to transmit information and applications from the system of interest to people).	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18c	Determine which classes of components, both internal and external to the organization's networks, are used by people (e.g., users, attackers) to access the system.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18d	Determine where information from the system of interest is stored for backup purposes.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18e	Determine which other systems access information or applications from the system of interest and which other classes of components can be used to access critical information or services from the system of interest.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58

Introduction OCTAVE-S V1.0

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook (cont.)

Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
Step 22	Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) for each active threat to each critical asset.	Risk Profile Impact Evaluation Criteria	Phase 3 Process S4 S4.1 Evaluate Impacts of Threats	9-54
Step 24	Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) for each active threat to each critical asset. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.	Risk Profile Probability Evaluation Criteria	Phase 3 Process S4 S4.3 Evaluate Probabilities of Threats	9-54
Step 26	Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of each critical asset's Risk Profile worksheet.	Risk Profile Security Practices	Phase 3 Process S5 S5.2 Select Mitigation Approaches	9-54
Step 27	Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk. For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.	Risk Profile	Phase 3 Process S5 S5.2 Select Mitigation Approaches	9-54

2 Critical Asset Information Worksheet for Systems



OCTAVE-S V1.0

tep 6	Step 7	
Critical Asset	Rationale for Selection	
Vhat is the critical system?	Why is this system critical to the organization?	
tep 9		
Related Assets		
Which assets are related to this	c sustan?	
vnich asseis are retatea to this	s system:	
nformation:	Applications:	
normation.	•• •	
Other:		
citor.		

Critical Asset Information Worksheet: Systems

Ste	p 8			
Des	cription			
	o uses the system?	Who	is res	ponsible for the system?
,			,	
Ste	р 10			o 11
Sec	urity Requiremer	nts	Mo Rec	st Important Security Juirement
:		requirements for this system? the security requirements should be for this system, not what they currently are.)	is m	ich security requirement tost important for this em?
0	Confidentiality	Only authorized personnel can view information on		Confidentiality
			0	Integrity
0	Integrity	Only authorized personnel can modify information on	0	Availability
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Other
0	Availability	must be available for personnel to perform their jobs.		
		Unavailability cannot exceed hour(s) per every hours.		
۵	Other			

3 Risk Profile Worksheet for Systems -Human Actors Using Network Access

Phase I
Process S2
Activity S2.3

	Activity S2.3
Step 12	Complete the threat tree for human actors using network access. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.
	If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the <i>Threat Translation Guide</i> (see pp. 60-63 of this workbook).
Step 13	Record specific examples of threat actors on the Risk Profile worksheet for each applicable
	actor-motive combination.
Step 14	Record the strength of the motive for deliberate threats due to human actors. Also record how confident you are in your estimate of the strength of the actor's motive.
Step 15	Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe
	your data are.
Step 16	Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a

scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.


Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

Human Actors Using Network A	Access	Basic Ri					Risk	Profile
Step 12			Step 2	2				Ì
Three For which branches is there a non-ne the asset? Mark these branches on the For which of the remaining branches no possibility of a threat to the asset?	gligible possibil e tree. is there a neglig	rible possibility or	What i	is the p	otential	Values impact applica	on the	a?
Asset Access Actor	Motive	Outcome						
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
		disclosure						
	accidental	modification						
		loss, destruction			<u> </u>			
inside		interruption						
	deliberate	disclosure modification						
network	1	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure					<u> </u>	
	accidental	modification		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
	_	loss, destruction	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	1	
outside		interruption		<u></u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u></u>	L
		disclosure					I .	
	deliberate	modification						
		loss, destruction						
		interruption						

Basic Ri	isk Profile												Hu	ımaı	n Ac	tors	Usi	ing N	letwoi	k Acce	ess
Step 24			Step	26															Step	27	
How likely occur in th	obability v is the threat the future? Ho are you in you	w	Security Practice Areas What is the stoplight status for each security practice area?							Who app add	pproach it is your roach for ressing it risk?	.									
Value	Confidenc	e		s	trate	gic							Ope	ratio	nal						
	Very Somewhat	Not At All	1. Sec Training	2. Sec Strategy	3. Sec Mgmt	4. Sec Policy & Reg	5. Coll Sec Mgmt	6. Cont Planning		7. Phys Acc Cntrl	8. Monitor Phys Sec	9. Sys & Net Mgmt	10. Monitor IT Sec	11. Authen & Auth	12. Vul Mgmt	13. Encryption	14. Sec Arch & Des	15. Incident Mgmt	Accept	Defer Mitigate	Mingare
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] [0	0 0	3



Threat Context		Human Actors Using	Network Access					
Step 14		Step 15						
Mo	Motive History							
How strong is the actor's motive?	How confident are you in this estimate?	How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?					
High Medium Low	Very Somewhat Not At All		Very Somewhat Not At All					
		times in years						
		times in years	0 0 0					
		times in years						
3.22 m 23 h		times in years						
		times inyearstimes inyearstimes inyearstimes inyears						
		times in years	0 0 0					
		times in years						
		times in years	0 0 0					
		times in years						
		times inyearstimes inyearstimes inyears						
	0 0 0	times in years						

Step 16

Human Actors Using Network	k Access		Areas of Con	cern
Insiders Using Network Acces	SS			
Give examples of how insiders acting accidentally could use network access to threaten this system.				
Give examples of how insiders acting deliberately could use network access to threaten this system.		·		
Outsiders Using Network Acc	ess	 		
Give examples of how outsiders acting accidentally could use network access to threaten this system.				
Give examples of how outsiders acting deliberately could use network access to threaten this system.				
	1			

Areas of Concern	
	Insiders Using Network Access
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1 1 1	
())	
	Outsiders Using Network Access

4 Risk Profile Worksheet for Systems -Human Actors Using Physical Access

Phase 1
Process S2
Activity S2.3

	Activity S2.3
Step 12	Complete the threat tree for <i>human actors using physical access</i> . Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.
	If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the <i>Threat Translation Guide</i> (see pp. 64-67 of this workbook).
Step 13	Record specific examples of threat actors on the <i>Risk Profile worksheet</i> for each applicable actor-motive combination.
Step 14	Record the strength of the motive for deliberate threats due to human actors. Also record how confident you are in your estimate of the strength of the actor's motive.
	·
Step 15	Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.

Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a

scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Step 16

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.


Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

Human Actors Usin	g Physical A	ccess					Basic	Risk	Profile
Step 12 Step 22									
	Thre	at				_	Values		
the asset? Mark these	For which branches is there a non-negligible possibility of a threat the asset? Mark these branches on the tree.			What is the potential impact on the organization in each applicable area?			ea?		
For which of the remaining branches is there a negligible possibility or no possibility of a threat to the asset? Do not mark these branches.									
Asset Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome						
						_			
				ation	cial	Productivity			_
				Reputation	Financial	Produ	Fines	Safety	Other
			disclosure						
		accidental	modification						
			loss, destruction						
	inside	1	interruption						
					1	1	1	1	
		1	disclosure				<u> </u>		
		deliberate	modification						
physica	1		loss, destruction						
			interruption						
			P T		Γ	1			
			disclosure		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	1 T	L	
		accidental	modification			<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
		1	loss, destruction	_		<u> </u>			
	outside	1	interruption						
			disclosure	Γ		T	I	1	
		3.39	[1 T	I	I	 	
		deliberate	modification		<u> </u>	L	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
			loss, destruction		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
			interruption		<u></u>				

Basic Risk Profile		Human Actors Using 1	Physical Access
Step 24	Step 26		Step 27
Probability How likely is the threat to occur in the future? How confident are you in your estimate?	Secur What is the stoplight status for ea	rity Practice Areas ach security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
Very Somewhat Not At All	 Sec Training Sec Strategy Sec Mgmt Sec Policy & Reg Coll Sec Mgmt Cont Planning 	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Mitigate
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			000
		要为1000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0 0
			0 0 0
			0 0 0
			0 0 0
			0 0 0
			0 0 0



Threat Context		Human Actors Using Physical Access				
Step 14 Step 15						
Motive		History				
How strong is the actor's motive?	How confident are you in this estimate?	How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?			
High Medium Low	Very Somewhat Not At All		Very Somewhat Not At All			
		times in years	0 0 0			
		times in years				
		times inyears				
		times in years				
		times in years times in years times in years times in years				
		times in years	0 0 0			
		times in years	0 0			
		times in years	0 0 0			
		times in years				
		times in years times in years times in years				
		times in years				

ep 16 Iuman Actors Using Physica	l Access	٦		Areas of (Concern
Insiders Using Physical Acces					
Give examples of how insiders acting accidentally could use physical access to threaten this system.		·			
Cive examples of how			 		
Give examples of how insiders acting deliberately could use physical access to threaten this system.					
Outsiders Using Physical Acc	ess				
Give examples of how outsiders acting accidentally could use physical access to threaten this system.					
Give examples of how outsiders acting deliberately could use physical access to threaten this system.					
·					
	<u> </u>		 		

Areas of Concern	
	Insiders Using Physical Access
	·
	Outsiders Using Physical Access
!	ı ı

5 Risk Profile Worksheet for Systems - System Problems

Phase 1 Process S2 Activity S2.3

Step 12 Complete the threat tree for system problems. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset. If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the Threat Translation Guide (see pp. 68-71 of this workbook).

- Step 15 Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.
- Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.

Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

System Problems						Basic	Risk	Profile
Step 12		•	Step 2	2				
the asset? Mark these bra For which of the remainin	Threat re a non-negligible possibili nches on the tree. ig branches is there a negliga o the asset? Do not mark the	ible possibility or	What i	is the p	otential	Values impact applica	on the	a?
Asset	Actor	Outcome						
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
		disclosure						
	software defects	modification		,				
		loss, destruction						
		disclosure						
	system crashes	modification loss, destruction						
	,	interruption				<u> </u>		
		disclosure					<u> </u>	
	hardware defects	modification				<u> </u>		
		loss, destruction			<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
	 	interruption						
		disclosure						
	malicious code	modification						
	(virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door)	loss, destruction						
		interruption					<u></u>	

Basic Risk Profile		S	ystem Problems
Step 24	Step 26		Step 27
Probability How likely is the threat to occur in the future? How confident are you in your estimate?	Securial What is the stoplight status for e	rity Practice Areas each security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
Very Somewhat Not At All	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Mitigate
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			0 0 0
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			0 0 0

System Problems					Thre	at Co	ontext
		Ste	ep 15	,			
				History			
			How often has this th occurred in the past			accura ie data	
·			·		Very	Somewhat	Not At All
	disclosi	ure [times in	years		u	
software	defects modific	cation	times in	years	0	0	
	loss, de	estruction	times in	years			
	interrup	otion	times in	years			
	disclos	ure [times in	years	0	0	
system c	rashes modific	cation	times in	years	0		
	loss, de	estruction	times in	years		0	
	interruj	ption	times in	years			
	disclos	ure [times in	years	0	0	
hardware	defects modifie	cation	times in	years		0	
	loss, de	estruction	times in	years	0	<u> </u>	
	interru	ption	times in	years			
	disclos	ure	times in	years		<u> </u>	
maliciou		cation	times in	years	0		
(virus, w horse, ba	vorm, Trojan ack door) loss, de	estruction	times in	years		<u> </u>	
	interru	ption	times in	years			
1							

reat Context	System Proble
Notes	
Notes	
What additional notes about each threat do you we	ant to record?
·	
	2.5
4.44	

Step 16 **Areas of Concern System Problems Software Defects** Give examples of how software defects could threaten this system. **System Crashes** Give examples of how system crashes could threaten this system. **Hardware Defects** Give examples of how hardware defects could threaten this system. **Malicious Code** Give examples of how malicious code could threaten this system. (Consider viruses, worms, Trojan horses, back doors, others)

Areas of Concern	
Software Defects	
<u> </u>	
	-
System Crashes]
System Crashes	-
W. J D.C. 4]]
Hardware Defects	-
	_
Malicious Code	\dashv
].
]

6 Risk Profile Worksheet for Systems - Other Problems

Phase 1 Process S2 Activity S2.3

- Complete the threat tree for *other problems*. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.

 If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the *Threat Translation Guide* (see pp. 72-77 of this workbook).
- Step 15 Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.
- Step 16 Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22 Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24
Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26 Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.

Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

Other Problems						Basic	Risk	Profile
Step 12			Step 2	2				
	Threat				_	Values		1
the asset? Mark these bra			What i organi	s the po zation	otential in each	impact applica	on the ible are	a?
For which of the remaining no possibility of a threat to	ig branches is there a negligi o the asset? Do not mark the	ible possibility or ese branches.						
Asset	Actor	Outcome					•	
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
		disclosure						
	power supply	modification						
	problems	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	telecommunications	modification						
	problems or unavailability	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	third-party problems	modification			<u> </u>			
	or unavailability of third-party systems	loss, destruction						
	5 3 4 4 5	interruption						
		disclosure						
	natural disasters	modification						
	(e.g., flood, fire, tornado)	loss, destruction						
		interruption						

Basic Risk Profile			Other Problems
Step 24	Step 26		Step 27
Probability How likely is the threat to occur in the future? How confident are you in your estimate?	Secur What is the stoplight status for ea	rity Practice Areas ach security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
Total	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	O O Accept O O Defer O O Mitigate

Other Problem	s			Threat Context
		S	Step 15	·
			History	
			How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?
				Very Somewhat Not At All
		disclosure	times in years	
	power supply	modification	times in years	0 0
	problems	loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
		disclosure	times in years	0 0 0
	telecommunications	modification	times in years	
	problems or unavailability	loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
		disclosure	times in years	
	third-party problems	modification	times in years	
	or unavailability of third-party systems	loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times inyears	
		disclosure	times in years	
	natural disasters	modification	times in years	
	(e.g., flood, fire, tornado)	loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	

reat Context	Other Problem
Notes	
What additional notes about each threat do ye	ou want to recora?
·	

Step 16 **Areas of Concern Other Problems Power Supply Problems** Give examples of how power supply problems could threaten this system. **Telecommunications Problems** Give examples of how telecommunications problems could threaten this system. **Third-Party Problems** Give examples of how thirdparty problems could threaten this system. **Natural Disasters** Give examples of how natural disasters could threaten this system.

Telecommunications Problems Third-Party Problems
Telecommunications Problems
Third-Party Problems
Natural Disasters

Other Problems (cont.)						Basic	Risk	Profile
Step 12			Step 2	.2				
		Impact Values						
the asset? Mark these brai			What is the potential impact on the organization in each applicable area?			a?		
For which of the remainin no possibility of a threat to	ng branches is there a neglig to the asset? Do not mark the	ible possibility or ese branches.						,
Asset	Actor	Outcome						
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
		disclosure						
	physical configuration	modification						
	or arrangement of buildings, offices, or	loss, destruction						
	equipment	interruption						
		disclosure						
		modification						
		loss, destruction				:		
		interruption						
		disclosure			l			
		modification						
		loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure			<u> </u>		ł	
		modification		I		· 		
	i	loss, destruction						
		interruption						

Basic Risk Profile		Other P	roblems (cont.)
Step 24	Step 26		Step 27
Probability How likely is the threat to occur in the future? How confident are you in your estimate?	Secur What is the stoplight status for ea	rity Practice Areas ach security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
Very Somewhat	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Mitigate

Other Problem	ns (cont.)			Threat Context
		S	Step 15	
			History	
			How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?
				Very Somewhat Not At All
		disclosure	times in years	
	physical configuration	modification	times in years	
	or arrangement of buildings, offices, or	loss, destruction	times in years	
	equipment	interruption	times in years	
		disclosure	times in years	0 0 0
		modification	times in years	
	j	loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
		disclosure	times in years	0 0 0
		modification	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
		disclosure	times in years	
	<u> </u>	modification	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	

hreat Context	Other Problems (c	on
	Notes	
	Notes	
What additional notes abou	ut each threat do you want to record?	
		·

Step 16 **Areas of Concern** Other Problems (cont.) **Physical Configuration Problems** Give examples of how physical configuration of buildings, offices, or equipment could threaten this system. Give examples of how could threaten this system. Give examples of how could threaten this system. Give examples of how could threaten this system.

Areas of Concern	
	Physical Configuration Problems
	·
	1
·	
	·
	·

7 Network Access Paths Worksheet

	Phase 2 Process S3
	Activity S3.1
Step 17	Select the system of interest for each critical asset (i.e., the system most closely related to the critical asset).
	·
Step 18a	Review paths used to access each critical asset, and select key classes of components related to each critical asset.
	Determine which classes of components are part of the system of interest.
Step 18b	Determine which classes of components serve as intermediate access points (i.e., which
Step 160	components are used to transmit information and applications from the system of interest to people).
Step 18c	Determine which classes of components, both internal and external to the organization's networks, are used by people (e.g., users, attackers) to access the system.
Step 18d	Determine where information from the system of interest is stored for backup purposes.
Stop 180	Determine which other systems access information or applications from the system of
Step 18e	interest and which other classes of components can be used to access critical information or services from the system of interest.

Step 17

System of Interest What system or systems are most closely related to the critical asset? **Access Points** Intermediate System of **Access Points** Interest Step 18b Step 18a **Intermediate Access Points System of Interest** Which of the following classes of Which of the following classes of components are used to transmit components are part of the system information and applications from of interest? the system of interest to people? Which classes of components could serve as intermediate access points? ■ Internal Networks □ Servers ■ External Networks Internal Networks ☐ Others (list) ☐ On-Site Workstations ☐ Others (list)

Note: When you select a key class of components, make sure that you also document any relevant subclasses or specific examples when appropriate.

	Access Points	
System Access by People	Data Storage Locations	Other Systems/ Components
Step 18c	Step 18d	Step 18e
System Access by People	Data Storage Locations	Other Systems and Components
From which of the following classes of components can people (e.g., users, attackers) access the system of interest? Consider access points both internal and external to your organization's networks.	On which classes of components is information from the system of interest stored for backup purposes?	Which other systems access information or applications from the system of interest? Which other classes of components can be used to access critical information or applications from the system of interest?
☐ On-Site Workstations	☐ Storage Devices	-
☐ Laptops	Others (list)	<u> </u>
☐ PDAs/Wireless Components		-
☐ Home/External Workstations		
Others (list)		

8 Threat Translation Guide

Phase 1
Process S2
Activity S2.3

Threat Translation Guide

The *Threat Translation Guide* describes each branch of an asset-based threat tree. If you have difficulty understanding the types of threats represented by a branch, you can use this guide to decipher the meaning of that branch.

You will find asset-based threat trees for the following sources of threat:

Source of Threat	Page
Human actors using network access	60-63
Human actors using physical access	64-67
System problems	68-71
Other problems	72-77

Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
				disclosure
			accidental	modification
				loss, destruction
		inside		interruption
				disclosure
			deliberate	modification
	network			loss, destruction
				interruption

Description	Example		
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally views confidential information on an important system.	Incorrect file permissions enable a staff member to accidentally access a restricted personnel database.		
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally modifies information on an important system.	A staff member accidentally enters incorrect financial data into a customer database.		
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally loses or destroys information on an important system.	A staff member deletes an important customer file by mistake.		
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally interrupts access to an important system.	A staff member who is not computer savvy inadvertently crashes an important system.		
•			
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately view confidential information on an important system.	A staff member uses access to a restricted personnel database to deliberately view information in that database that is restricted by policy.		
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately modify information on an important system.	A staff member responsible for data entry deliberately enters incorrect customer information into a database.		
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately lose or destroy information on an important system.	A staff member with access to design documents for a new product deliberately deletes the files that contain those design documents.		
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to	A staff member uses legitimate access to the computing infrastructure to launch a denial-of-service attack on an		

Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
	network	 !		
				disclosure
			accidental	modification
				loss, destruction
		outside		interruption
				disclosure
			deliberate	modification
				loss, destruction
				interruption


Description	Example			
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and views confidential data on a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally views confidential personnel data.			
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and accidentally modifies information on a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally modifies important customer data.			
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and loses or destroys information on a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally loses or destroys financial data.			
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and accidentally interrupts access to a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally crashes an important system.			
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to view confidential information.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to a key business system. The spy uses that access to view confidential customer information on the system.			
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to modify information.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to a key business system. The spy uses that access to modify financial data on the system.			
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to lose or destroy information.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to a key business system. The spy uses that access to lose or destroy a new product design on the system.			
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to interrupt access to a system.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to an airline's scheduling system. The spy uses that access to crash the system and prevent real-time updates.			

Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
	•			disclosure
			accidental	modification
				loss, destruction
		inside		interruption
	•			disclosure
			deliberate	modification
	physical			loss, destruction
				interruption

Example Description A staff member accidentally sees confidential information A staff member without malicious intent accidentally views on (1) a colleague's computer screen or (2) a printout on a confidential information after gaining physical access to a colleague's desk. system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the information. A staff member modifies information by (1) accidentally A staff member without malicious intent accidentally altering information on a colleague's computer while using modifies information after gaining physical access to a it for another purpose or (2) accidentally taking a page of a system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the printout on a colleague's desk. information. A staff member loses or destroys information by (1) A staff member without malicious intent accidentally loses accidentally deleting information from a colleague's or destroys information after gaining physical access to a system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the computer while using it or (2) shredding a paper accidentally taken from a colleague's desk. information. A staff member without malicious intent interrupts access to A staff member interrupts access to a system by (1) accidentally crashing the system while accessing it from a a system or information by accidentally using physical colleague's computer or (2) locking the keys inside an office access to a system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the information to prevent others from accessing the where a physical file is stored. system or information. A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically A staff member with malicious intent deliberately views restricted area of the building to deliberately (1) view confidential information by breeching physical security and confidential information on a computer or (2) read a accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a confidential memo lying on a desk. physical copy of the information. A staff member with malicious intent deliberately modifies A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically restricted area of the building to deliberately (1) modify information by breeching physical security and accessing information on a computer or (2) modify a physical file components of the computing infrastructure or a physical lying on a desk. copy of the information. A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically A staff member with malicious intent deliberately loses or restricted area of the building to deliberately (1) delete destroys information by breeching physical security and information on a computer or (2) destroy a physical file accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a physical copy of the information. lying on a desk. A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically A staff member with malicious intent deliberately interrupts restricted area of the building to (1) gain access to and then access to an important system or information by breeching deliberately crash an important business system or (2) jam physical security to a system, one of its components, or a the door and prevent others from physically accessing the physical copy of the information and using that physical systems and information located in that area of the building. access to prevent others from accessing the system or information.


Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
	physical			
			·	disclosure
			accidental	modification
·				
				loss, destruction
		outside		interruption
		1 outside		1
				V. d
				disclosure
			deliberate	modification
				loss, destruction
		·		interruption

Example Description A consultant is given access to a staff member's office and An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access accidentally sees confidential information on (1) a staff to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of member's computer screen or (2) a printout on a staff information and uses that access to view confidential member's desk. information accidentally. A consultant is given access to the computer room and (1) An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access accidentally makes the wrong change to a configuration file to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of on a server or (2) accidentally records the wrong information and uses that access to modify information accidentally. information in a maintenance log. A consultant configuring one of your servers is given access An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access to the computer room and accidentally (1) destroys an to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of important electronic file or (2) throws away an important information and uses that access to lose or destroy information accidentally. piece of system documentation. A consultant configuring one of your servers is given access An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access to the computer room and accidentally (1) crashes a system to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of while accessing it or (2) locks the keys to the computer information and uses that access to accidentally prevent room inside it after he or she leaves. others from accessing the information. A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to An attacker with malicious intent deliberately views gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and confidential information by breeching physical security and view confidential information either (1) on a key business accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a system or (2) in a physical file. physical copy of the information. A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to An attacker with malicious intent deliberately modifies gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and information by breeching physical security and accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a physical modify financial information either (1) on a key business system or (2) in a physical file. copy of the information. An attacker with malicious intent deliberately loses or A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and destroys information by breeching physical security and destroy customer information either (1) on a key business accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a system or (2) in a physical file. physical copy of the information. A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to An attacker with malicious intent deliberately interrupts access to an important system or information by breeching gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and (1) deliberately crashes an important business system or (2) physical security to a system, one of its components, or a jams the door to prevent others from physically accessing physical copy of the information and by using that physical the systems and information located in an area of the access to prevent others from accessing the system or building. information.




^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
A software defect results in disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	A defect in a computer's operating system changes file access permissions to permit world read and write permissions on certain files and directories.
A software defect results in modification of information on a system.	A custom software application incorrectly performs mathematical operations on data, affecting the integrity of the results.
A software defect results in the loss or destruction of information on a system.	A word processing application is known to crash computers periodically because of a problem with a specific command sequence, destroying any information that was not saved.
A software defect results in a system crash, preventing access to the system.	A word processing application is known to crash computers periodically because of a problem with a specific command sequence, preventing access to that computer.
A system crashes for unknown reasons (i.e., it cannot be traced to a software defect, hardware defect, malicious code, or actions by people), resulting in disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
to unaudiorized parties.	
A system crashes for unknown reasons (i.e., it cannot be traced to a software defect, hardware defect, malicious code, or actions by people), resulting in modification of information on that system.	A system crashes during a lengthy update of a financial database, corrupting the information in the database.
A system crashes for unknown reasons (i.e., it cannot be traced to a software defect, hardware defect, malicious code, or actions by people), resulting in the loss or destruction of information on that system.	A customer database system frequently crashes, destroying any information that was not saved at the time of the crash.
	An email server crashes, resulting in interruption of user




^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
A hardware defect results in disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
A hardware defect results in modification of information on a system.	A disk drive develops a hardware problem that affects the integrity of a database that is stored on the disk.
A hardware defect results in the loss or destruction of information on a system.	A disk drive develops a hardware problem that ends up destroying the information on the disk. Files can be retrieved only from backups.
A hardware defect results in a system crash, preventing access to the system.	A disk drive develops a hardware problem, preventing access to any information on the disk until the problem is corrected.
A system is affected by malicious code (virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door) that enables unauthorized parties to view information.	A back door on a system enables unauthorized people to access the system and view customer credit card information on that system.
horse, back door) that enables unauthorized parties to view	access the system and view customer credit card
horse, back door) that enables unauthorized parties to view information. A system is affected by malicious code (virus, worm, Trojan	access the system and view customer credit card information on that system. A system is infected with a virus that modifies a process



^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
Problems with the power supply lead to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
Problems with the power supply lead to modification of information on a system.	
Problems with the power supply lead to loss or destruction of information on a system.	A power outage results in loss of any information that was not saved at the time of the outage.
Problems with the power supply lead to interruption of access to a system.	A power outage prevents access to all key business systems.
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to modification of information on a system.	
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to loss or destruction of information on a system.	
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to interruption of access to a system.	The unavailability of the telecommunications link prevents access to a key business system located at a remote site.



^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	A staff member from a third-party service provider views confidential information on a key business system that is maintained by that service provider.
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to modification of information on a system.	Problems at a third-party service provider lead to the modification of information on a key business system located at that provider's site and maintained by the provider.
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to loss or destruction of information on a system.	Problems at a third-party service provider lead to the destruction of information on a key business system located at that provider's site and maintained by the provider.
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to interruption of access to a system.	A system maintained by a third-party service provider and located at the provider's site is unavailable due to problems created by that provider's staff.
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	People at the site of a tornado see confidential memos that are dispersed among the debris.
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to modification of information.	
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to loss or destruction of information.	The flooding of a basement area destroys paper records that are stored there.
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to interruption of access to a system.	The flooding of a computer room in the basement of a building prevents access to systems in that room.

ther Problems (con	t.)	
Asset	Actor	Outcome
		disclosure
	physical configuration	modification
•	or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment	loss, destruction
		7000, 000,000
		interruption
		disclosure
		modification
		loss, destruction
		interruption

^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	The layout of an office workspace enables anyone in the area to view customer credit card information displayed on computer screens.
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to modification of information on a system.	
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to loss or destruction of information on a system.	
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to interruption of access to a system.	
	,

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existing data sources, gathering this burden estimate or any oth Services, Directorate for inform	collection of information is estimated to average and maintaining the data needed, and compler aspect of this collection of information, includation Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson erwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washin	eting and reviewing the collecting suggestions for reducing Davis Highway, Suite 1204, A	tion of informa this burden, to	ition. Send comments regarding o Washington Headquarters
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	Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnera			
	sessment and planning technique le from an organization assume re			
	-S is a variation of the approach ta			
	mall organizations (less than 100)			
	people) of an organization's perso			
protection strategy	and mitigation plans based on the	organization's uniqu	e operatio	nal security risks. To
conduct OCTAVE-	S effectively, the team must have	broad knowledge of t	he organiz	ation's business and
security processes	s, so it will be able to conduct all ac	tivities by itself.	-	
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